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GUSTAV RADBRUCH
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN*

As recently as the end of the last World War the name and work
of Gustav Radbruch were virtually unknown in the Anglo-American
legal world. In 1938 Roscoe Pound, in his encyclopedic survey, Fifty
Years of Jurisprudence,' had given a concise account of Radbruch's
legal philosophy in the context of his section on "neo-idealism." In
1944 Anton Hermann Chroust 2 wrote a penetrating analysis of Radbruch's philosophy of law, and about the same time the first edition
of the present writer's Legal Theory, published on the other side of
the Atlantic, included Gustav Radbruch in the survey of major legal
philosophers. It also acknowledged the author's deep indebtedness
to Radbruch's principal work.3
Since Radbruch died in 1949 at the age of seventy-one, there has
been a dramatic and welcome change. Not only has he remained
the dominating figure in post-war Continental and especially German
legal philosophy; in both Britain and the United States his work
and views have been discussed by leading jurists such as Professors
Campbell and Hart in Britain, and Professors Fuller and Patterson
in this country. Radbruch's Rechtsphilosophie was at last made accessible (in 1950) to English readers through the translation of his
principal work in the Twentieth Century Series of Legal Philoso4
phers.
The continuing vitality of his contribution is demonstrated by the
place it occupies in the recent discussion between Professors Hart 5
and Fuller. 6 This remarkable transformation can certainly not be
accounted for by the relatively modest volume of Radbruch's work
in legal philosophy-which in this respect does not remotely compare,
for instance, with that of his contemporary Del Vecchio-nor can it
be attributed to the simple and classical beauty of his style which
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. Author, Legal Theory (4th ed.
1960).
The author is greatly indebted to Professor 0. Kahn-Freund for a number
of helpful suggestions and comments.
1. See Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REV. 444 at 454
(1938).
2. Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of Gustav Radbruch, 53 PHILOSOPHICAL'

REv. 23 (1944).

3. .ADBRUCH, GRUNDZuEGE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPnIE (3d ed. 1932).
4. THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES Or LASK, RADBRUCH AND DABiN (Wilk transl.
1950).
5. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).
6. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
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even the best English translation can only incompletely reflect. Perhaps it is not even the greatness of his intellectual contribution as
such that has, after a long and lamentable delay, restored some
balance between the almost exclusive Anglo-American preoccupation
with the formal Neo-Kantianism of the Kelsen school, and a legal
philosophy of values, which has been Radbruch's principal concern.
I am convinced that the main reason for the posthumous influence of
Radbruch is the link of the man's philosophy with his life and personality. Perhaps a contemporary could have analysed the transition
from Plato's Republic to his Laws in conjunction with Plato's personal
experiences with the Athenian democracy of his time, and with the
tyrant of Sicily whom he served for a time as political advisor. For
us, however, Plato as a man lives in the distant past, a legendary
figure. But Radbruch is a man and a thinker of our time. Born in
1878, in a Germany bursting with national pride, growing power and
prosperity, and seemingly secure in the nearly half century of peace
that ended in 1914, Radbruch lived through the two major catastrophies known as World War I and World War II, and through all
the social, political and intellectual revolutions that accompanied and
followed these cataclysmic events. For the last four years of his lifebrief but immensely significant-he played a noble and prominent
part in the attempt to help Germany find her bearings and to build
a new scheme of values from the ruins of the Nazi debacle.
In Radbruch's work, as in that of no other legal philosopher,7 life
and philosophy constantly react upon each other. While he strove to
apply his intellectual convictions to his conduct, as private person,
politician, and legal reformer, the tough and often shattering experiences of his life as soldier, politician, administrator, and scholar
constantly influenced the development of his philosophy-which was
never finished, never static, and which ends with a question mark.
Because Radbruch is of our time and generation, because he suffered
and faced far more courageously than most of us, the struggles and
agonies of a world that has lost the deceptive security of the pre-1914
era, and is still always on the edge of catastrophe, his writings mean
so much more to us than those of many other legal philosophers whose
output has been far more voluminous and perhaps even of greater
intellectual brilliance. It is for this very reason that some knowledge
of Radbruch's life is not just a matter for a biographer, but an essential key to the understanding of his legal philosophy, for his entire
life reflects the tensions that characterize our Western civilization,
and the attempt of an individual to realize himself without cheap
compromise and without self-deception.
7. Perhaps, with the exception of Petrazhitsky, who ended his life under

the regime of Marshal Pilsudski in 1931.
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In Radbruch's life there was a tension between the bourgeois professor, descended from generations of peasants and merchants, who
through ability and industry attained academic distinction and could
have led a sheltered and respected life in one of Germany's old university towns, and the dedicated humanitarian and social reformer
who joined the Socialist movement and became an active and prominent member of the principal workers' party.
There was, closely related, the tension between the man of contemplation and the man of action. Training, inclination, and the not
very frequent combination of brilliant gifts as teacher and scholar
made Radbruch yearn for the academic life. But a sense of duty and
commitment-to his country, to the underprivileged, and to humanity
-made him seek the life of active politics and of public office. The
two periods of office as Reichsminister of Justice, between 1921 and
1923 were the culmination of Radbruch's political career. He came to
this high office first as a relatively young man of 43, because he was
for a considerable period the only lawyer of distinction in the
Socialdemocratic Party in the Reichstag, and the only man capable
of coping with the essentially legislative tasks of the Ministry of
Justice. But Radbruch's proudest moment was the agonizing period
of a few hours when in 1920 he faced the indignant and aroused
workers of the city of Kiel, as one committed to their cause and deeply
hostile to the just defeated reactionaries of the right-wing "KappPutsch," and succeeded in saving hundreds of the captured Kappists
from lynching by the angry crowd. This act of individual civic
courage-far more difficult than the bravery of war which has comradeship and the approval of the great majority behind it-was a
matter of deep inner satisfaction to a man whose sensitivity, abhorrence of violence and even timidity made him instinctively shrink
from mob scenes and public violence. Not long before, Radbruch, a
Socialist, a pacifist and a hater of violent national passions, had felt
compelled to volunteer in his late thirties for front line service in
World War I as a private, because he wanted to share the fate and the
suffering of the common man, to the amelioration of whose lot he was
dedicated. 8
Perhaps the verdict of history will be that Radbruch was more successful as a teacher and scholar than as an active politician. His
tenure as Reichsminister of Justice was too short to enable him to
push through cherished measures of legislative reform, especially
his draft of a new German Criminal Code-which still remains a
draft. Greatly though we may regret it, the really successful political
8. Radbruch's thoughts and feelings are movingly expressed in a letter
written from the trenches to his small daughter reprinted in RADBRUCH, DER
INNERE WEG,

AuFm~ss

MEINEs LEBENS

115

(1957).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

leaders have always had a streak of ruthlessness or cunning, or a combination of both. Guile, cunning and ruthlessness were alien to
Radbruch's nature; he had to reconcile his deep Socialist convictions
with his sense of justice and legality, and his abhorrence of violence
and cruelty. This struggle between objectivity and partisanship for
the cause that one believes in, is of course one of the perennial problems facing a person of integrity-and especially a lawyer-called to
active political office, and the tension is, as we shall see, deeply
reflected in Radbruch's legal philosophy.
There was also in Radbruch the tension between the artistic and
the intellectual temperament. This man-who could have become a
not inconsiderable poet, who had the deepest appreciation of the
visual arts and who later in life developed a love for music-had in
many ways an essentially artistic, a Goethean approach to the universe, an intuitive grasp of the world as a structure whose component
parts, though in perpetual tension and motion, united to form an
edifice of unsurpassed beauty and magnificence. But as an intellectual Radbruch was essentially and avowedly an heir of Kant. Like
all Neo-Kantians, he accepted the division of Sein and Sollen, of
perception and volition, as basic. His analysis of the principal legal
values as antinomic, the basis of his relativistic philosophy of law,
can also be seen as a development of the Kantian distinction between
pure reason and practical reason. Kant had wisely separated the
world of perception (pure reason) from the world of conduct and
action (practical reason). And even though the latter was directed
by the "categorical imperative" ("act in such a way that the maxim
of your action can be made the maxim of a general action") the
modern jurist, sociologist and political scientist knows that the
seemingly compelling and unambiguous character of this maxim is
capable of conflicting and irreconcilable interpretations. Bentham as
well as Marx, Hegel as well as Duguit, can claim that the maxims of
their legal philosophy comply with the categorical imperative. Trying
to overcome the dualism between pure and practical reason, Stammler
had sought to deduce universally valid principles of conduct from
a formalized practical reason, an attempt in which he utterly failed. 9
Kelsen, another Neo-Kantian, regards the attempts to disguise value
preferences as science as futile. His solution is to eliminate all formulations of values, i.e., all legal "philosophy" proper from the theory of
law and to confine legal science to a formal structure of norms applicable to any legal order.
Neither of these methods was satisfactory to Radbruch, for whom
law as a cultural science was directed to the realization of values in
9. For a detailed critique of Stammler see FREDmANN, LEGAL THEonY 130-38
(4th ed. 1960).
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life. And while, as a Neo-Kantian, he accepted the dualism of Sein
and Sollen, his artistic vision, his Goethean temperament as well as
his deep dedication to the use of law for the realization of social
purposes, led him to place emphasis upon the problem of values and
their implementation in law. The beauty as well as the pathos of
Radbruch's legal philosophy lies in that constant struggle-between
the intellectual divisions of the mind and the vision of a legal order
in which the various parts seek to form a unity; between the irreconcilable conflict of antinomic values not amenable to compromise and
the realization that life (and law as the organization of social life)
is a complex composite of infinite shades and variations; between the
scientific rigour and honesty that demanded, for Radbruch as for his
older friend Max Weber, a clear separation of objective science-a
matter of cognition-and the realization of values and purposes in
life-a matter of volition, decision and faith.
To this intellectual tension corresponded the personal tension between scepticism and faith which accompanied Radbruch through his
life. The scepticism of the clear, rational thinker made Radbruch
reject the ideology of so many legal philosophers, so brilliantly-and
in this writer's view most dangerously-represented by Hegel's system
of legal philosophy. It also kept Radbruch, of Protestant heritage,
away from the organized church throughout his life. Yet a deep
desire to believe and impart faith to others, a desire which he could
not satisfy either with the unquestioning acceptance of organized
Christian religion or with the pseudo-religious faith of the orthodox
Marxist, made him seek all his life for a faith that could unite the
opposites and resolve the doubts. This desire was deepened both by
the collective tragedy of the Nazi perversion of human values and the
personal tragedy of the loss of both his children in their middle
twenties. Significantly, Radbruch's last essay is entitled Gnade und
Gerechtigkeit (Grace and Justice). In a sense, the tentative transformation of Radbruch's postwar legal thinking which made him
modify, if not abandon, his relativistic philosophy and look for a
modicum of absolute justice, is a reflection of this tension between a
scepticism-which at no time meant lack of conviction-and a deep
desire to believe in transcendental values.
The result of all these tensions and conflicts in Radbruch's life
and work is a number of relatively brief writings whose significance
far outstrips their volume. While, for an understanding of the man
Gustav Radbruch, such works as his Kulturlehre des Sozialismus'o or
his work on the nineteenth century writer Theodor Fontane, whose
10. First published in 1922. The most recent version is the third edition,
published in 1949.
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alternative title is significantly Scepticism and Faith," and most certainly Radbruch's short autobiography 12 are essential, an appreciation
of his place as a legal philosopher must and can concentrate on his
principal treatise, 5 and on the brief but highly significant postwar
writings on legal philosophy, which have been the subject of a
voluminous and still continuing discussion. 14
THE LEGAL PHImosoPHY OF RELATIVISM

To what extent Radbruch, in the last phase of his life, meant to
modify or even abandon the legal philosophy of relativism is a much
debated question to which we will turn later in this essay. Be that
as it may, his outstanding intellectual and systematic contribution
remains the legal philosophy as developed in the third edition of his
Rechtsphilosophie, published in 1932. Its direction is determined by
the blending of three major intellectual influences:
(1) The Kantian distinction of Sein and Sollen, of perception and
volition. From this Kant himself had, in Radbruch's own words,
"taught us the impossibility of deducing what is right, what ought to
be, from that what is." The antithesis to this methodical dualism was
the monism of the Hegelian school which fused "is" and "ought,"
reality and reason: "what is reasonable is real, and what is real is
reasonable." This is not the place to discuss the Hegelian system of
philosophy and its application to law and the state. Suffice it to say,
that the Hegelian way to overcome Kantian dualism-such as his use
of the dialectic method in order to demonstrate the Prussian hereditary monarchy, the nationalist state, or the pre-eminence of the husband in marriage, as being both historically and logically necessary
to, and therefore reasonable evolutions of the world spirit-could
not be acceptable to a man of Radbruch's intellectual and moral integrity.
(2) Radbruch was, however, strongly influenced by the attempt of
various neo-Kantian movements prospering in Germany in the first
quarter of the present century to go beyond Kant's seemingly unbridgeable antithesis between Sein and Sollen. Radbruch pays tribute
to Stammler whose theory of "right law" distinguished legal concept
(Rechtsbegriff) and idea of justice (Rechtsidee) with the object of
11.

LADBRUCH, THEODOR FONTANE, ODER SKEPSIS ufl

(first published 1945).

GI.UAE

(3d ed. 1954)

12. RADBRUcH, DEa INNER WEG, AuFRmss MmENs LEBENs (1957).
13. RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHiIOSOPHIE (1914). The citations in this article are

to various editions. The 3d edition appeared in 1932; the 4th and 5th, edited
after the author's death by Erik Wolf in 1950 and 1956, respectively.
14. VORSCHULE DEa RECHTSPHImOSOP= (1947) and some essays collected in
DER MTENSCH im RECHT (1957), and in the posthumous editions of RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE.
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developing both as categories of general logical validity. Stammler,
by trying to make Kant's practical reason (in the field of law) a
matter of theoretical insight, had to make it formal in character. But
as Stammler wanted to make his idea of justice at the same time a
practical guide to conduct, he mitigated the formality of his idea of
justice sufficiently to turn it into "an anaemic version of Kant's categorical imperative," "a hybrid between a formal proposition and a
definite social idea, kept abstract and rather vague by the desire to
remain formal."'15
While this way out of the dilemma was unacceptable to Radbruch,
he was no more content with Kelsen's different Neo-Kantianism.
Though agreeing with Kelsen's distinction between the normative
character of law as a social science and the empirical character of the
natural sciences-an important distinction developed by Rickert and
Lask-he could not be satisfied with Kelsen's rejection of values as
incompatible with a "science" of law. From their own premises neither
Stammler nor Kelsen could develop a philosophy of law; a system of
legal values.
(3) A way out of the dilemma was offered to Radbruch by the
teachings of Rickert and Lask treating law as a Kulturwissenschaft,
i.e., as a science directed to the realization of certain values.' 6
On the one hand our "value-neutral" (wertblind) conduct creates
from the chaos of matter the realm of nature. For nature is nothing
else but existence (Gegebenheit), purified of falsifying valuations.
Conversely, spirit becomes conscious of the proportions of these valuations, of the norms and their connection, in a deliberately valuating
conduct which confronts nature as the realm of values. 17 Radbruch
accepts the methodological dualism of Kantian and neo-Kantian
philosophy. The world of values cannot be deduced from the world
of reality.'8 While ideas are tied to matter (stoffbestimmt) this does
not mean that the idea, e.g., the idea of law, is predetermined in the
matter (e.g., the legal materials). Thus there are obvious limits to
the attempt to deduce legal norms from the "nature of things" (Natur
der Sache).19
But Radbruch rejects the rigid separation of "is" (sein) and "ought"
(sollen) exemplified by Stammler's rigid distinction between the
concept of law (Rechtsbegriff) and the idea of law (Rechtsidee). For
Radbruch no human endeavour-even the making of a table-can
15. See FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 106 (3d ed. 1953).
16. RADERUCH, REcHTsPHILosoPHIE (4th ed. 1950).

17. Id. at 91.
18. Cf. Max Weber's celebrated essay written in 1917, Der Sinn der Wertfreiheit der soziologischen und oekonomischen Wissenschaften, published in
GESAMMELTE AuFS E=E zUR WISSENSCHAFTsLEMIa

19. On this see further infra.

(1922).
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be understood without relation to the idea which it seeks to realize.
The concept of law can only be defined as the reality striving towards
the idea of law. Law as a cultural phenomenon is value-related. Legal
philosophy is a cultural philosophy of law seeking to relate the matter
of law to the idea of law, instead of either separating or fusing them.
"The idea of law is value, law is value-related reality, a cultural
20
phenomenon."
Thus, the neo-Kantian dualism of reality and value becomes a
trialism of reality (Wirklichkeit), value (Wert), and value-related
reality (wertbezogene Wirklichkeit).
This methodological approach lays the foundations for Radbruch's
understanding of the task of legal philosophy as that of relating legal
reality, (such as statutes, decisions, administrative regulations) to
basic ideas. But at this point he parts company not only with the
Hegelian approach or with the ideological absolutism of natural law,
but also with the formalization of the idea of justice by Stammler or
the denial of a scientific relevance of legal ideas by Kelsen. Radbruch's approach is that of "scientific relativism," in which he was
particularly influenced by Max Weber during his first Heidelberg
period. It was the latter, as well as Radbruch's life-long friend and
fellow-jurist Hermann Kantorowicz who time and again, amidst the
passions of war and political strife, developed the thesis that norma21
tive sciences such as sociology, economics, and law are "value-free."
It is perhaps the unfortunately chosen term "relativism" that has
accounted for the almost ridiculous misunderstanding that the relativism of Max Weber and Gustav Radbruch denotes indifference to
values. The personal life of both these great men who were active
and courageous fighters in the cause of democracy would in itself
refute such an approach. There is, moreover, no foundation for such
a view in their work. A relativistic approach for Radbruch, as for
Weber, simply meant that it was not possible to prove scientifically
the correctness of nationalism or internationalism, of democracy or
20. RADBRUCH, RECHTSPMLOSOPmE 118 (4th ed. 1950). Radbruch acknowledges his debt to Emil Lask as the founder of this approach to legal philoso-

phy.
21. Cf. Max Weber's celebrated essay written in 1917, Der Sinn der Wertfreiheit der soziologischen. und oekonomischen Wissenschaften, published in
GESAMMELTE AUFS'AETZE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE (1922).

22. Several noted reviewers have suggested alternative descriptions of
Radbruch's legal philosophy. Thus, Georges Gurvitch calls it an "antinomic"
philosophy of law. Eduard Spranger describes it as "dialectic," leading to an

"existentialist" philosophy, where the conflict situation rises above the choice
between thesis and antithesis to the dedication of the entire person. Karl
Jaspers, on the other hand, distinguishes relativism from existentialist

philosophy and criticizes the former as indulging in a "comfortable tolerance."
Radbruch himself, in noting all these views [RECHTSPHILOSOPME 102-03 (5th

ed. 1956) ] says rightly that, as understood by Jaspers, his legal philosophy was
one of existentialism, not of relativism.
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autocracy, of socialism or capitalism. Law was indeed the implementation of values, and legal systems could be developed in great detail
from certain basic value premises. Nor was it Radbruch's view that

a legal system incorporated only one legal value. But ultimately the
balance between the conflicting values incorporated in a possible

legal system, or the measure of their blending, was a matter of decision, of faith-not of knowledge. In Radbruch's own words, it was

"a matter of conscience (Gewissen), not of science" (Wissenschaft).
THE ANTINOmY OF VALUES

In contrast to Stammler, Radbruch defines law as "the reality directed to the realization of legal values of the idea of law." The idea
of law can only be justice. But at this point Radbruch, the relativist,
must part company with all those legal philosophies that give justice
a substantive meaning. Such an approach would lead Radbruch
straight to the natural law philosophy, which he rejects (at least in
his principal work). To hold that certain actions or institutions, e.g.,
private property or community property, are just or unjust, for instance, would mean expressing a particular political or social idea
in absolute terms. Radbruch's idea of justice is essentially the
Aristotelian one: Justice means equality, and it is divided between
"commutative" or "corrective" justice which means absolute equivalence, i.e., between injury and reparation; and distributive justice
which lays down the principles under which persons are to be treated
as equal. In one of his many succinct phrases Radbruch calls corrective justice the justice of private law, and distributive justice the
justice of public law.
It is clear that such a formal definition of justice is not by itself
a sufficient foundation of legal philosophy. Although justice instructs
us to treat equals equally and unequals unequally, it tells us nothing
about the perspective from which they are to be characterized as
equals or unequals in the first place; it determines only the proportion
but not the standard of treatment.
Because "justice" cannot yield objective criteria of equality, the
idea of law therefore demands a second component which is "utility"
(Zweckmaessighkeit). This means a determination of the values
which law is destined to serve. There are three categories of valuation: individual values, collective values, and work values. 23 Legal
systems emphasize either individualism, collectivism, or what Radbruch styles transpersonalism.
23. In the hand-written notes to the third edition Radbruch refers to a

similar division of values in the work of the philosopher Jaspers and also to
the trilogy of "Certainty, Justice, Utility" in CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE
LAw (1924).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

The first values the individual and his integrity higher than the
needs of either the community or of any cultural, scientific, technical
or other achievements of civilization. This is typified by the American
Constitution. The second sees that individual life as well as achievements of civilization culminate in community life. This is typified by
Hegel's philosophy. The third would consider an Egyptian pyramid
or a modern road or dam through a fever-stricken country as more
important than the thousands of lives sacrificed for this work. Radbruch2 4 quotes the question posed by Sir George Knollys to Sir
George Birdwood on what he would do if he were alone in a burning
house with a living child and Raffael's madonna (to which Sir George
Birdwood answered that he would give preference to the madonna).
This questioil became acute on a colossal scale when during the last
'war military operations demanded the destruction of immortal
masterpieces of art.
In Racdbruch's own formulation, the ultimate aims corresponding
to these three s6ales of values are: for the individualistic philosophy,
the idea of liberty; for the transindividualistic philosophy, the idea
of nation25 ; for the transpersonal philosophy, the idea of civilization.20
The individualistic conception uses the legal concept of contract
(social contract theories), the second uses the notion of organism
(German theories of corporate personality), the third uses the symbol
of an edifice erected by the common work of all. Whereas legal and
political history provide abundant illustrations for both individualistic
and collective systems, the transpersonal valuation has, according
to Radbruch, hardly yet found adequate expression in social life. The
syndicalist idea comes nearest to it. But in the existing forms of
syndicalism, notably in the Fascist State, Radbruch sees but a perversion of the transpersonal idea used to bolster the power of the
State.27
Radbruch examines the principal political ideologies in relation to
24. RADBRUCH, RECHTSPMILOSOPMIM 150 (3d ed. 1932).

25. In a note made by Radbruch himself during the Second World War on
his copy of the third edition, he illustrates the "supra-individualistic philosophy" as that of the "all demanding state, i.e., a state which does not recognize
either the interests of the individual or the objective laws of civilization as
the limits of its operations." By way of illustration Radbruch mentions an
urgent operation undertaken by a doctor on an injured child during an air
alarm in Tokyo. An army officer ordered the light visible behind the window
to be extinguished, because "children are reborn, but a non-executed command of the emperor brings inextinguishable disgrace." RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHLosoPlE 151 (5th ed. 1956).
26. The German term Kultur is usually translated by "civilization," but
this tends to obscure the essentially spiritual meaning of the word.
27. It would seern-that Duguit's postulate--of social solidarity as the guiding
fact of a legal order would come nearest to what Radbruch calls a transpersonal system. The political and legal philosophy of the U.S.S.R. seems to
stand between the second and third type, emphasizing the collective against
individual values, but putting the achievement of social works above life.
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these basic values and shows how liberalism emphasizes the individual
as an abstract autonomous unit and idealizes it in the "Rights of
Man," whereas democracy sees the individual citizen in relation to
others from the standpoint of equality. Social reformism and socialism, by inquiring into social and economic reality, reveal the rigidity
of formal equality and aim at mitigating formal justice by equity
while still considering the individual as the ultimate value. Conservatism on the other hand adheres to the organic conception of a
political community. Radbruch follows these basic values through
such varied legal institutions and systems as property, marriage, corporate personality, the relations of state and law, and the possibilities
of international law. The development of the institutions of contract,
marriage, and property illustrates the increasing infusion of collectivist thought into originally individualist institutions and valuations. In
the conception of a world state, the citizen of which would be the
individuals of the whole world, Radbruch sees an application of the
individualist ideal; in the nationalist state he sees an application of
the collectivist idea, and in a society of states, organized in international law, an application of the transpersonal idea.
Radbruch devotes particular attention to the different purposes of
punishment and the different types of criminals. Criminal law was
his principal and most beloved discipline, and beside his legal philosophy, the draft of a new German criminal code, completed but not
adopted during his period of office as Reichsminister of Justice, is
Radbruch's most important work.
The different possible purposes of punishment illustrate for Radbruch in a particularly telling manner the antinomic values of law.
Commutative justice demands punishment as retribution, proportionate to the crime. Those theories of punishment which emphasize
utility (Zweckmaessigkeit) demand that punishment be measured in
proportion to the guilt of other criminals. This can lead to the deterrent theory or to the corrective theory. In the case of the criminal
from conviction (Ueberzeugungsverbrecher) there is an irreconcilable
antinomy between the moral duty which makes the criminal commit
the crime and the duty of the judge to inflict punishment, perhaps
even the duty of the criminal to suffer and accept punishment, like
Socrates, for the sake of the integrity of the legal order.
For alongside justice and utility, the third essential component of
the idea of law is security, in other words, positivity of the law. Positivity of law often means certainty at the expense of justice or the
consideration of the individual case. Even patently unjust decisions
continue to be recognized in the interest of legal stability. In history
the authoritarian police state tends to make utility the dominant
element; the natural law period emphasizes the element of justice and
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tries to give it substance; legal positivism considers nothing but certainty of the law and neglects both justice and utility. But the freer
judicial interpretation advocated by modern theories emphasizes
again utility rather than certainty.
Between these three pillars of the idea of law there is perpetual
tension. None can ever be singly or exclusively realized in an actual
legal order, although one usually prevails over the others. There are
passages in Radbruch's work which suggest that justice (in his
formal sense) and positivity are more basic than utility. Here Radbruch speaks as the philosopher, not as the politician or the moralist.
Which of the different social and political orders he prefers is clear
from his adherence to social democracy which, to Radbruch, is essentially a form of individualism. Although economic analysis may
oppose socialism to individualism, because the former does not consider economic life as the free play of individual wills, any supraindividualistic regulation in a socialist society ultimately serves the
individual.
The one political value that is inseparable from relativism is democracy.
Relativism is the intellectual precondition of democracy. It refuses to
identify itself with a definite political opinion but is ready to let any
political opinion which can obtain a majority take over the leadership of
the state, because it does not know any unambiguous criterium for the
correctness of political vies, it does not acknowledge the ability of a
point of view above the parties .... Relativism teaches at once decisive28
ness of one's own and justice toward the other person's position.
The brief and inevitably selective account given here cannot remotely do justice to the richness and beauty of Radbruch's book.
Its outstanding characteristic is its aliveness. Every page links thought
and life, generalizations and concrete illustrations. Art, poetry, history, and philosophy, all are linked with legal ideas in a style whose
lucid simplicity is probably unmatched in the history of legal philosophy.
THE LATER RADBRUCH-UNSOLVED PROBLEMS
Although the view that Radbruch's "scientific relativism" meant
indifference to values or even the equivalence of good and evil is
28. RIABRUCH, RECHTSPHLOSOPHME 84 (5th ed. 1956). Cf. the observations of
another great relativist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919): "[W]hen men have realized that time
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundation of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out."
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patently absurd, it is certainly true that relativism gives no definite
guidance to the individual but on the contrary makes him conscious
of the agony and the responsibility of choice between antagonistic
values. Relativism presupposes a well functioning democratic system, and it is subject to fewer strains in a settled democracy such as
Great Britain than in the turbulent conditions threatening a fragile
democracy which prevailed in the Germany of the 1930's.
The first question arising from the linking of relativism and democracy is whether it compels democracy to tolerate a party or a
movement opposed to its very foundations-such as the Nazi movement. It seems that only in a lecture given abroad during the Nazi
regime-when Radbruch had been dismissed from his Heidelberg
chair-Radbruch gave an answer.29 Here he said in a reaffirmation
of his relativistic philosophy that:
[DIemocracy can do anything-except to renounce itself. Relativism can
tolerate any opinion-except the opinion which claims absolute dominion.
•.. When an opinion claims absolute validity and for this reason holds
itself entitled to seize power or retain power without regard to the
majority, it must be fought with its own weapons, not only by ideas and
discussions but by the power of the state. Relativism is general tolerance
-but not tolerance towards intolerance.
Had this philosophy-on which Radbruch himself had not, however,
expressed himself clearly before-been applied by the Weimar Republic, it would certainly have outlawed perhaps not the Nazi Party
as such, but certainly its militant movements such as the SS and the
SA. That lesson at least has been learned by the Bonn Republic
where the constitutional court has been given power to outlaw "parties
which, by their aims or the conduct of their adherents, purport to
injure or abolish the free democratic order or to imperil the existence
of the Federal Republic. '30 In implementation of this provision the
constitutional court a few years ago outlawed a neo-Nazi party.
This same lecture-which seems to have been strangely neglected
in the spate of discussions about Radbruch's intellectual evolutiongives other indications of Radbruch's incipient doubts about the
adequacy of his legal philosophy in any time of total perversion of
values, such as that occurring in his own country. Although this
lecture reaffirms the philosophy of relativism, it is anxious to prove
that it represents a "strong, even aggressive conviction." The lecture
reasserts the necessity of positivism, but it goes on to assert that it
demands liberalism, separation of powers-and socialism. That relativism demands a liberal democracy, i.e., tolerance, is plausible, for
29.
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30. GRUNDGE ETZ FUER DIE BUNDESREPUBLiK DEUSTSCHLAND art. 21 § 2.
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the reasons and with the limitations just indicated. But in asserting
that relativism leads to socialism, Radbruch jumps from a theoretical
to a sociological and political argument. "In the comparison of ideas
those will be victorious to which a sociological force, be it capital
or the masses, lends its suggestive strength. The liberation of the
inborn ideological power of the idea, the leap from necessity to
liberty, is socialism. Thus relativism leads to socialism." Here it
seems that an expression of faith and defiance is substituted for
rational thinking.
It is the brief and fragmentary post-war writings of Radbruch that
have produced a quantity of discussion out of all proportion to their
volume. In these four eventful years, when Radbruch was reinstated
and was, morally as in fact, the dean of West German law teachers,
Radbruch went some way toward the acceptance of a "higher law"
doctrine, of the kind that he had rejected all his life.31
As a German in the tradition of Kant, Goethe and Schiller, as a
European and humanitarian who, while a good German patriot, was
never a nationalist, as a Democratic Socialist, and as a Christian,
Radbruch abhorred all that the Nazi system stood for. Fortunately
for posterity he was too old-and perhaps too much respected even by
those among the Nazis who had not lost all sense of human valuesto be arrested. He was, however, immediately dismissed from his
chair. Except for a very fruitful year at Oxford 32 and occasional lectures abroad, he refused a number of offers of permanent teaching
appointments abroad. Thus, Radbruch witnessed most of the Nazi
period and of the war in Germany, and he suffered deeply from the
collapse of all the values he had held dear. One problem paramount
in his mind was the adequacy of legal philosophy including his own,
to cope with the denial of elementary justice that the Nazi regime
represented, and the official perpetration of mass murder and other
systematic cruelties and degradations in the name of the state-and
thus, in a strictly positivist definition, of the law. The relativism of
Weber, Radbruch, or Kantorowicz was never "positivist" in the sense
that it accepted a strict division of "Is" and "Ought" in the function
and development of the law. The concept of law as "value-related
reality" meant constant preoccupation with the implementation of
basic values in a given legal order, and therefore a heightened awareness of the moral, political and social issues with which a legal
system is concerned. But relativism did not make it possible to condenn any particular legal order-however autocratic, however in31. See in particular his famous essay Gesetzliches Unrecht und uebergestzliches Recht (1946), reprinted in RECHTSPHILOSOPME, app. 4 (4th ed.
1950, 5th ed. 1956).
32. From which resulted Der Geist des Englischen Rechts.
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human-as being beyond the pale of law. In accepting the pillar of
Rechtssicherheit as one of the three essential foundations of law, relativism of course only reaffirmed the obvious truth that in organized
society there must be a law positing authority. But many Germans,
including Radbruch, came to wonder whether the value of authority
and security in the law, and the postulate of obedience, had become so
dominant an element in the attitude of the Germans of the second
and third Reich that they found it easy to accept any order from the
supreme power of the state as "law," even if the content of the order
was the extinction of millions of helpless individuals, or the degradation of the human being to a guinea pig.33
As a politician, a humanitarian, a social reformer, Radbruch, like
many others, could oppose all that National Socialism stood for. He
could fight to destroy such an order, but he could not regard it as
being no legal order at all. This, however, was subject to one important qualification which has not, I think, been sufficiently stressed
in the post-war discussions of Radbruch's philosophy: law requires
a minimum of "structure." It must be an "order," i.e., there must be
a definite and stable relationship between the various arms of state
authority, and a hierarchy of legal norms. In this respect Radbruch
did not differ from Kelsen and his school, and in his above-quoted
essay on relativism he stressed that separation of powers is an essential consequence of the relativistic approach. But even if this is
not accepted, a definite relationship is inherent in the concept of a
normative order. From this point of view, the latest phases of the
Nazi regime when pronouncements by Hitler made in an outburst of
rage were held as overruling any formal laws-because all "law"
emanated from the Fuehrer-could well be held to destroy the legal
order and produce a state of anarchy, even from a formal point of
view. From the Aristotelian postulate of equality, which Radbruch
had incorporated in his definition of justice, it was possible to deduce
"that law should be certain, that it could not be interpreted and applied in one way today and in another tomorrow, in one way here
'34
and in another way there.
33. Professor Fuller, among others, attributes with Radbruch the progress
of National Socialism to the "general acceptance of the positivistic philosophy
in pre-Nazi Germany." Fuller, supra note 6 at 657. Professor Hart strongly
rejects this view. Hart, supra note 5 at 617. I am inclined to attribute far
less blame to the open legal positivism of men like Bergbohm and Binding
than to the pseudo-idealism of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. It is the Hegelian
identification of any state with "the" state as the rational embodiment of
individual liberty, his identification of reason and reality, his teaching of
the absolute subservience of the individual to the authority of the state,
because the latter embodies the "sittliche Rechtsidee," that has poisoned German (and much non-German) legal and political thinking. It enabled many
Germans to continue to profess "idealism" while in effect sanctioning the
absolute authority of state power. It is not surprising that neo-Hegelian
philosophy was a powerful ideological prop of the Nazi regime.
34. Gesetzliches Unrecht und uebergesetzliches Recht in REcHTSPmiosoPrin
353 (5th ed. 1956).
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But Radbruch felt compelled to go further. Starting from his
definition of law as an order designed to serve justice, he said that
"where the contradiction between the positive law and justice reaches
so intolerable a degree that the law as unright law (unrichtiges
Recht) must cede to justice, the force of positive law must yield to
the higher demand of justice." 35 Radbruch was well aware of the
difficulties of such a proposition. He conceded that there were numerous laws objectionable to morality or decent human standards which
yet could not be regarded as lacking the force of law. He admitted
that the line could not be drawn sharply but maintained that "where
justice is not even aimed at, where equality which is at the heart of
justice is deliberately denied in the making of positive law, the law
is not only unright, but it lacks legal nature altogether." Well aware
that the denial of the legal nature of duly enacted statutes could bring
grave dangers, Radbruch suggested that the task of invalidating laws
should be reserved either to the legislator-which is, of course, the
obvious and universal process of changing law no longer acceptable
to public opinion-or to a high court. Insofar as the Bonn Constitution embodies enforceable human rights and puts limitations on governmental powers, the latter proposal has been substantially implemented by the creation of a federal constitutional court in Germany,'
which has the exclusive power of deciding on the constitutionality of
36
statutes.
Of Radbruch's principal commentators, some have seen in this
evolution of Radbruch's thinking little more than a shift in the
relation between the three pillars of law: justice, utility, and security.3 7 Baratta stresses in particular that the implicit assumption
in Radbruch's philosophy of law was that the individual was a subject and not merely an object of the legal order. This part of the
argument we may accept. The postulate of the human individual as
an essentially autonomous being endowed with a conscience is the
Grundnorm of Radbruch's thinking. But none of these arguments
can dispose of the contrary demonstration by another of Radbruch's
disciples made in a deeply perceptive and sympathetic study 38 that
35. The term unrichtigesRecht was coined by Stammler.
36. Important reservations must, however, be made to this statement in
view of the opinions expressed in some German judgments, and especially in
a judgment of the German Federal Supreme Court, (BGZ Vol. 11 App. p. 34
ff.) that even certain provisions of the Bonn Constitution could be held
invalid in the light of higher unwritten legal principles. According to this
opinion the judge "must be left the power to examine whether constitutional
norms are compatible with higher norms of the constitution or of suprapositive law."
37. See in particular Baratta, Relativismus und Naturrecht im Denken
Gustav Radbruch's in 45 ARcHmv FUER REcHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOsopmE 505.
See also Erik Wolf, Umbruch oder Ent-wicklung in Gustav Radbruch's
Rechtsphilosophie, 45 ARCHiv FUER REcHTs- UND SOZIALMILOSOPHIE 481.
38. HIPPEL, GUSTAV RADBRUCH ALS RECHTSPHLOSOPHISCHER DENKER
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in postulating minimum requirements of justice, however elementary,
for the qualification of a statute or order as law, Radbruch had
abandoned his formal definition of justice for a substantive definition.
It is evident that, in speaking of a minimum of "equality," Radbruch
postulated, perhaps unconsciously, a definite principle of distributive
justice as compelling, where in his principal work he had regarded
the formal role of equality as the only basic principle of distributive
justice, expressing the Grundnorm of the political order. No amount
of argument can obscure the fact that this implies the substitution
of a modicum of natural law principles, a minimum of "goodness," as
a yardstick by which to test the validity of law.
Certainly Radbruch did not wish to substitute a sweeping natural
law philosophy for the work of his lifetime. Nor was he any less
conscious than at any previous period of his life of the deep, and
often irreconcilable antinomy of values. Professor Fuller has stated
Radbruch's dilemma in these terms:
Germany had to restore both respect for law and respect for justice.
Though neither of these could be restored without the other, painful
antinomies were encountered in attempting to restore both at once, as
Radbruch saw all too clearly. Essentially Radbruch saw the dilemma as
that of meeting the demands of order, on the one hand, and those of
good order, on the other. Of course no pat formula can be derived from
this phrasing of the problem. But, unlike legal positivism, it does not
present us with opposing demands that have no living contact with one
another, that simply shout their contradictions across a vacuum.3 9
Both Fuller and Hart, in their recent controversy,40 accept, like
von Hippel, that there was some transformation in Radbruch's thinking. They debate a situation dealt with in several German post-war
decisions, and discussed by Radbruch himself. In the typical case, a
faithless wife had used the excuse of a war-time Nazi statute which
authorized and possibly ordered information on utterances hostile to
the state, i.e., to the Nazi regime, to report to the special tribunal
derogatory remarks about Hitler made by her husband within the
four walls of her home, while he was on leave from the front. The
wife insisted in giving this information, even though the presiding
judge of the court had warned her that she was under no obligation
to give evidence under oath, that her husband was under threat of
capital punishment, and that without sworn evidence testimony was
not likely to carry much weight. As the result of the wife's insistence
on it her husband was kept under arrest.
After the war the wife, like a number of others who had acted
39. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REv. 636, 657 (1958).
40. See notes 5, 6 supra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 14

similarly, was held guilty of false imprisonment, not on the ground
of invalidity of the statute but because of the freedom of choice exercised by the wife, in relating a private remark that she knew was
bound to lead to the imprisonment or death of her husband. The
wider problem adumbrated by Radbruch and discussed by Professors
Hart and Fuller is not, however, essentially dependent on the question
whether a particular Nazi statute could retroactively be held invalid
as contrary to fundamental standards of morality.41 Even if the wife
had no duty to inform or-as was undoubtedly the case-had effective
freedom to inform or not to inform, criminal prosecution was only
possible by subordinating the legitimacy of her action under the law
as it stood to some higher moral duty. The moral decision in this
case is not difficult-though again from a post-Nazi, not a Nazi
philosophy point of view. It is far more difficult and poignant in
42
situations such as those dealt with in the so-called Justice case.
This case is both more typical and more difficult than that of the
Nazi leaders who were convicted at Nuremberg not as agents of the
Nazi regime but as its very personification or, on the other hand, the
case of the informer wives who used the law to get rid of their husbands so that they could carry on their adulterous relations. In the
Justice case, senior civil servants, judges, and prosecutors were convicted of one of the various crimes listed in the Nuremberg Charter
by virtue of their participation in inhuman decrees (such as the
notorious Nacht uT.d Nebel Decree), or judgments by special courts,
in the course of their ordinary duties. At what point did the official
duty of these men to carry out their tasks assigned to them yield to
a higher duty of humanity? Some of these men were Nazis by conviction, others were careerists, and others just took, like the vast
majority of men and women everywhere, the line of least resistance.
It is strange that this case has not received more discussion in jurisprudential literature.43 None illustrates more pungently the moral
dilemma which troubled Radbruch so deeply. No doubt he would
have discussed this problem with his customary courage and lucidity
had he lived longer. As it is, we cannot know where he would have
41. On this point, the question whether it would be theoretically preferable
to declare the post-war laws exceptionally of retroactive validity, a theory
more consonant with positivism, or whether to openly apply the "higher law"
duty as superior to the normal duty of obedience to statute seems to me to
be relatively unimportant. In either case it requires a legal revolution to
substitute new morals and legal standards for the old ones. The interpretation
of values will occur either under the guise of retroactivity of a statute or by
the reinterpretation of a duty to obey selected positive laws.
42. 3 TaIALS or WAR CRuVIInALS (before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
under Control Council Law) No. 10 (1951).
43. See the present writer's review of the Justice case in 67 HARV. L. REv.
1284 (1954); further his article on Uebergesetzliche Rechtgrundsaetze und die
Loesung von Rechtsproblemen, 41 ARcHIV FUER RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPIE
348, 364 (1955); and LEGAL THEORY (4th ed. 1960).
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drawn the line between obedience, authority and the higher moral
duty. Nobody was more clearly aware than Radbruch of the difference between the high standards which make the few accept the
"moral duty" of rebellion at the risk of imprisonment, torture or
death, and the "legal duty" which must be measured in terms of the
average (i.e., the "reasonable") man.
Thus, Radbruch's work ends with a question mark. The question
mark, however, is confined to the final formulation of Radbruch's
theoretical position in the perennial conflict between the values of
44
security and justice.
There is no break in Radbruch's personality or in his approach to
the problems of law and life. His life as well as his work is a demonstration of humanity's unceasing struggle. Radbruch was never
content either with himself or with his theoretical formulations.
In that lies the vitality and nobility of both the man and his
work. Neither Radbruch nor anybody else has been able to resolve
the antinomies of life, and certainly his vision was not that of a "preestablished harmony," but that of a restless cosmos whose beauty
and grandeur results from a precarious balance between the neverending conflicts of life. I know of no other book in legal literature
that has as poignantly and as beautifully translated the inevitable
antinomies of life into legal values as Radbruch's Rechtsphilosophie.
44. In this writer's opinion nobody has, or is ever likely to find, a solution
that does not sacrifice one of several conflicting values. See the abovementioned article in the ARcHiv FUER RECHTS- uND SozIALPHmLosopmE, and
LEGAL THEORY (4th ed. 1960).

